#### MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANTS' REPLY IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO STRIKE 2 3 TABLE OF CONTENTS SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT......1 5 ARGUMENT ......2 6 7 II. Court's Look to Defendant's Activity, Not Plaintiff's Claims to 8 III. California's Anti-SLAPP Statute Protects Chabad's Religious 9 Expression Against UPC's Frivolous Lawsuit......4 10 A. Chabad's Kapparot Rite Is Expressive Activity Fully Protected by the Free Speech Clauses of the U.S. and California 11 Constitutions. ...... 6 12 B. UPC's Lawsuit is a Frivolous Attempt to Chill First Amendment 13 Rights......11 14 15 16 IV. UPC Is Not Entitled To A Public Interest Defense Under California 17 A. UPC Has Not Established That The Relief It Seeks Would 18 Significantly Benefit One Person – Let Alone A Large Class of 19 20 21 C. UPC Has Not Established That The Relief It Seeks Would Vindicate an Important Right Affecting the Public Interest. .... 23 22 D. UPC Has Not Established That Private Enforcement is 23 Necessary or that UPC Is Disproportionately Burdened. ...... 24 24 Conclusion 24 25 26

27

#### **TABLE OF AUTHORITIES**

Cases All. to End Chickens as Kapparot v. N.Y.C. Police Dep't, No. 156730/2015, Angelheart v. City of Burbank, 285 Cal. Rptr. 463 (Cal. Ct. App. 1991) ... 21 Animal Prot. & Rescue League, Inc. v. Chabad of Irvine, No. 30-2015-Baxter v. Salutary Sportsclubs, Inc., 19 Cal. Rptr. 3d 317 (Cal. Ct. App. Bd. of Educ. of Westside Cmty. Schs. (Dist. 66) v. Mergens, 496 U.S. 226 (1990) ...... 5 Blanchard v. DIRECTV, Inc., 20 Cal. Rptr. 3d 385 (Cal. Ct. App. 2004) . 10, Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751 (2014).............. 13, 21 Cal. Sch. Emps. Ass'n v. Del Norte Cty. Unified Sch. Dist., 4 Cal. Rptr. 2d 35 (Cal. Ct. App. 1992)......23 Capitol Square Review & Advisory Bd. v. Pinette, 515 U.S. 753 (1995) .... 5 

Castillo v. Pacheco, 58 Cal. Rptr. 3d 305 (Cal. Ct. App. 2007)
City of Erie v. Pap's A.M., 529 U.S. 277 (2000)9
City of Montebello v. Vasquez, 376 P.3d 624 (Cal. 2016)
Club Members for an Honest Election v. Sierra Club, 196 P.3d 1094
(2008)
Concerned Citizens of La Habra v. City of La Habra, 31 Cal. Rptr. 3d 599
(Cal. Ct. App. 2005)21
Cruz v. City of Culver City, 205 Cal. Rptr. 3d 736 (Cal. Ct. App. 2016) 22
Dwight R. v. Christy B., 151 Cal. Rptr. 3d 406 (2013)
Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347 (1976)22
Flannery v. Cal. Highway Patrol, 71 Cal. Rptr. 2d 632 (Cal. Ct. App. 1998)
21
Gerbosi v. Gaims, Weil, W. & Epstein, LLP, 122 Cal. Rptr. 3d 73 (Cal. Ct.
App. 2011) 3
Heffron v. Int'l Soc. for Krishna Consciousness, Inc., 452 U.S. 640 (1981) 5
Hernandez v. Comm'r, 490 U.S. 680 (1989)13
Hilton v. Hallmark Cards, 599 F.3d 894 (9th Cir. 2010)4
Holbrook v. City of Santa Monica, 51 Cal. Rptr. 3d 181 (Cal. Ct. App.
2006)
Holt v. Hobbs, 135 S. Ct. 853 (2015)13
DEFENDANTS' REPLY IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO STRIKE COMPLAINT

Hurley v. GLIB, 515 U.S. 557 (1995)8
Ingels v. Westwood One Broad. Servs., Inc., 28 Cal. Rptr. 3d 933 (Cal. Ct.
App. 2005)11
Int'l Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc. v. Lee, 505 U.S. 672 (1992) 9
Kaahumanu v. Hawaii, 682 F.3d 789 (9th Cir. 2012)
Lamb's Chapel v. Ctr. Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist., 508 U.S. 384
(1993)5
Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105 (1943)9
Navellier v. Sletten, 52 P.3d 703 (Cal. 2002)
Sammartano v. First Judicial Dist. Court, 303 F.3d 959, 973 (9th Cir. 2002)
22
Save Westwood Vill. v. Luskin, 182 Cal. Rptr. 3d 328 (Cal. Ct. App. 2014)
20
Schwarzburd v. Kensington Police Prot. & Cmty. Servs. Dist. Bd., 170 Cal.
Rptr. 3d 899 (Cal. Ct. App. 2014)
Simpson Strong-Tie Co., Inc. v. Gore, 230 P.3d 1117 (2010)
Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397 (1989)
Thomas v. Review Bd. of Ind. Emp't Sec. Div., 450 U.S. 707 (1981) 12
U.S. W. Falun Dafa Ass'n v. Chinese Chamber of Commerce, 77 Cal.
Rptr. 3d 710 (Cal. Ct. App. 2008) 5, 9, 10
DEFENDANTS' REPLY IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO STRIKE COMPLAINT

United Poultry Concerns v. Bait Aaron, No. BC592712, (Cal. Super. Ct.,		
Aug. 26, 2015)	15	
Warsoldier v. Woodford, 418 F.3d 989 (9th Cir. 2005)	22	
Weinberg v. Feisel, 2 Cal. Rptr. 3d 385 (Cal. Ct. App. 2003)	10	
Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263 (1981)	5	
Statutes		
Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 1021.5	23	
Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 425.16(a)	11	
Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 425.16(c)	17	
Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 425.16(c)(1)	17	
Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 425.16(e)(4)	4	
Cal. Code Civ. Proc. § 425.17(b)	18	
Cal. Code Civ. Proc. § 425.17(b)(2)	23	
Cal. Penal Code § 597(a)	23	

### **Other Authorities** Kelly Puente, "Judge Blocks Slaughter of Chickens in Jewish Holiday Ritual in Irvine with Temporary Restraining Order," Orange County Rabbi Jonathan Klein, "This Year's Los Angeles Kapparot Activities and Next Steps," Alliance to End Chickens as Kaporos (Oct. 19, 2015) ...... 15

#### **SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT**

UPC's goal is to "end the use of chickens in Kapparot nationally." It targets Orthodox Jewish synagogues and rabbis across the United States that perform this millennia-old religious rite in the traditional way, bringing frivolous lawsuits designed to chill lawful First Amendment activity. This is the definition of a SLAPP, strategic lawsuit against public participation. UPC is free to peacefully protest or attempt to further its goal through persuasion, but UPC has no right to coopt the force of the government to compel its interpretation of Kapparot. Chabad brings its Anti-SLAPP motion to deter UPC from continuing to harass synagogues with frivolous, recycled litigation.

Chabad's Kapparot rite is expressive activity, fully covered by the speech clauses of both the U.S. Constitution and the California Constitution. Religious speech is fully protected under the Free Speech clauses. Chabad's Kapparot rite combines symbolic physical acts with spoken words explaining the symbolism in the presence of others in the community. This public, expressive religious ritual falls squarely within the scope of activity that may seek refuge in the state's Anti-SLAPP statute.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> Statement is from the sworn declaration of UPC founder Karen Davis. Decl. Karen Davis ¶ 4, Dkt. No. 68-7.

1

3

5 6

7 8

10

11 12

13 14

15 16

17

18

19 20

21 22

23 24

25 26

27

28

The Court must strike the Complaint and shift attorneys' fees in order to deter UPC's frivolous lawsuits.

UPC's response brief asserts two defenses. Both fail.

First, because Chabad's expressive activity falls within Anti-SLAPP's protection, UPC bears the burden of establishing a "probability" that it will ultimately succeed on its lawsuit. However, UPC cannot succeed on its claim for all the reasons discussed in Chabad's Motion to Dismiss, including fundamental jurisdictional and standing flaws.

Finally, UPC is not entitled to the public interest exception. The injunction UPC seeks, instead of creating a significant, widespread benefit to a large class of people, is guaranteed to cause harm to Orthodox Jewish communities and will infringe on religious rights statewide.

#### ARGUMENT

### NOTICE OF MOTION

Chabad's Anti-SLAPP Motion was filed along with its Motion to Dissolve the TRO on October 11, 2016. Dkt. No. 23. Motions filed in connection with TROs are exempt from Local Rule 7-3. As the Court deferred ruling on most of the parties' arguments at the hearing, Chabad reasserted its Anti-SLAPP Motion along with its Motion to Dismiss on November 7, 2016. Dkt. No. 51. The briefs were filed after a series of **DEFENDANTS' REPLY IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO STRIKE COMPLAINT** 

communications with Plaintiff discussing the time for filing responses to Plaintiff's pleading. Counsel stated that the content would be similar to what was previously filed. Counsel believed UPC to have been on notice of the Anti-SLAPP motion. Decl. Michael Jones, Ex. A.<sup>2</sup>

### II. COURT'S LOOK TO DEFENDANT'S ACTIVITY, NOT PLAINTIFF'S CLAIMS TO DETERMINE WHETHER THE ANTI-SLAPP APPLIES.

As a preliminary matter, courts look to the defendant's activity to determine whether the Anti-SLAPP applies, not to plaintiffs' claims. *Navellier v. Sletten*, 52 P.3d 703, 711 (Cal. 2002); *Birkner v. Lam*, 67 Cal. Rptr. 3d 190, 198 (Cal. Ct. App. 2007). UPC argues that if the alleged conduct is criminal, that the Anti-SLAPP does not apply. Pl.'s Opp'n Anti-SLAPP Motion 6, Dkt. No. 71 (citing *Gerbosi v. Gaims, Weil, W. & Epstein, LLP*, 122 Cal. Rptr. 3d 73, 82 (Cal. Ct. App. 2011)). However, this exception is only for undisputed or admitted criminal conduct, rather than conduct that "may or may not be" criminal. *Gerbosi*, 122 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 82; *Dwight R. v. Christy B.*, 151 Cal. Rptr. 3d 406, 416 (Cal. Ct. App. 2013)

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>2</sup> As UPC received nearly two months to respond to the motion, UPC was not prejudiced if there was any unintentional miscommunication. By contrast, due to ambiguity in the emails, Chabad was unaware that UPC would file its Preliminary Injunction Motion on December 26, 2016, giving Chabad only one week over Chanukah to file a response. Dkt. No. 68. In the interest of a speedy resolution of the case, Chabad did not and does not object.

(holding the exception applies only to undisputed or uncontroverted criminal activity). Here, there was no criminal activity.

As multiple city officials have found, Chabad's Kapparot rite violates no laws and is not criminal. In 2014, Mr. R. Dunn, a special investigator for the California Department of Food and Agriculture, Ms. Kimberly Cherney, Animal Services Supervisor from the Irvine Police Department, and other uniformed Irvine Police Department officers were called to Chabad of Irvine on the day of the Kapparot rite. Decl. Rabbi Tenenbaum ¶¶ 12-13, Dkt. No. 69-2. Each of these city officials told Chabad that everything was legal and done pursuant to the law. *Id.* ¶ 14. They let the rite continue, while they watched, and then they left without finding any violation of law. *Id.* Chabad's activities are in full compliance with the law.

### III. CALIFORNIA'S ANTI-SLAPP STATUTE PROTECTS CHABAD'S RELIGIOUS EXPRESSION AGAINST UPC'S FRIVOLOUS LAWSUIT.

The Anti-SLAPP statute protects free speech activity that is covered under either the California or U.S. Constitutions. Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 425.16(e)(4) (protecting "conduct in furtherance of . . . the constitutional right of free speech"); *Hilton v. Hallmark Cards*, 599 F.3d 894, 903 (9th Cir. 2010) (holding conduct in furtherance of free speech rights includes "actual exercises of free speech rights"); *U.S. W. Falun Dafa Ass'n v. Chinese* 

1

4

5 6

7

8

10

11 12

13 14

15

16

17 18

19

20 21

22 23

24

25 26

27

28

Chamber of Commerce, 77 Cal. Rptr. 3d 710, 720 (Cal. Ct. App. 2008) (holding California's Anti-SLAPP protects Chinese Chamber's expressive event from plaintiffs suing to alter its expression).

The Free Speech clause of the U.S. Constitution fully protects religious speech. See Capitol Square Review & Advisory Bd. v. Pinette, 515 U.S. 753, 760 (1995).3 UPC implies that whenever a case involves religious speech or can be brought under the Free Exercise clause, that the Free Speech clause cannot apply. Pl.'s Opp'n Anti-SLAPP 5-6, Dkt. 71. This is not true. Many foundational free speech U.S. Supreme Court cases involve religious speech. See, e.g., Lamb's Chapel v. Ctr. Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist., 508 U.S. 384 (1993); Bd. of Educ. of Westside Cmty. Schs. (Dist. 66) v. Mergens, 496 U.S. 226 (1990); Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263 (1981); Heffron v. Int'l Soc. for Krishna Consciousness, Inc., 452 U.S. 640 (1981).

UPC relies on Castillo v. Pacheco, 58 Cal. Rptr. 3d 305, 307 (Cal. Ct. App. 2007) to argue that religious expression is categorically not protected by the Free Speech clause because it is covered by the Free

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>3</sup> UPC criticizes Chabad's citation of *Capitol Square* because the cases are not factually similar. Pl.'s Opp'n Anti-SLAPP 7, Dkt. 71. However, Chabad citied the case for the well established proposition that religious speech is as protected as secular speech.

Exercise clause. The state court in the parallel action erroneously denied the Anti-SLAPP motion based upon this flawed *Castillo* case. Minute Order, *Animal Prot. & Rescue League, Inc. v. Chabad of Irvine*, No. 30-2015-00809469-CU-BTCJC (Cal. Super. Ct., filed Sept. 11, 2015) [hereinafter "*APRL* case"], Dkt. No. 108; *see also* Chabad's Anti-SLAPP Brief, *APRL* case, Ex. B. <sup>4</sup> However, this Court is not bound by an intermediate state court as to the scope of the Free Speech clause of the United States Constitution. On this issue, it is bound by Supreme Court and Ninth Circuit precedent protecting religious expression. Chabad's religious speech and expressive conduct are shielded by the Anti-SLAPP.

## A. Chabad's Kapparot Rite Is Expressive Activity Fully Protected by the Free Speech Clauses of the U.S. and California Constitutions.

Chabad's Kapparot rite is a series of symbolic physical acts and spoken words performed together in community to express expiation or atonement. Decl. Rabbi Tenenbaum Supp. Reply, Ex. C. It involves gently turning a chicken over one's head for a total of nine rotations while reciting an appropriate text. *Id.* ¶ 2. While holding the chicken, the participant says:

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>4</sup> The state court did not find the Anti-SLAPP motion to be frivolous and later concluded the plaintiff lacked standing on its original complaint. Minute Entry, *APRL case* (Cal. Super. Ct., Aug. 19, 2016), Dkt. No. 180.

Children of man who sit in darkness and the shadow of death. bound in misery and chains of iron—He will bring them out of darkness and the shadow of death, and will sunder their bonds. Foolish sinners, afflicted because of their sinful ways and their wrongdoings; their soul loathes all food and they reach the gates of death-they cry out to the Lord in their distress; He saves them from their afflictions. He sends forth his word and heals them; He delivers them from their graves. Let them thank the Lord for His kindness, and proclaim His wonders to the children of man. If there be for a man even one interceding angel out of a thousand accusers, to speak of his uprightness in his behalf, then He will be gracious to him and say: Redeem him from going down to the grave; I have found expiation for him.

11

12

10

1

2

3

5

6

7

8

Males continue: This is my exchange, this is my substitute, this is my expiation. This rooster shall go to its death and I shall proceed to a good, long life and peace.

13 14

15

Females continue: This is my exchange, this is my substitute, this is my expiation. This hen shall go to its death and I shall proceed to a good, long life and peace.

16 17

18

19

20

Id. ¶ 5. The physical act of holding the chicken expresses the transfer of one's sins to the chicken. Id. ¶ 3. The physical act of killing the chicken, in a way that accords with halachic (Kosher) procedure, expresses expiation. Each of the physical acts in the rite is expressive. *Id.* ¶¶ 2, 4. The Kapparot rite is incomplete without both the physical, expressive acts and the

21 22

23

24

spoken word. Id. ¶ 6. 25

26

27

28

**DEFENDANTS' REPLY IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO STRIKE COMPLAINT** 

accompanying spoken words any more than the exchange of rings can be

The physical acts of the Kapparot rite cannot be separated from the

separated from the vows in a wedding ceremony. The Ninth Circuit has held that wedding ceremonies, which involve both speaking and physical acts, are protected expressive conduct because these ceremonies convey messages to those in attendance. *Kaahumanu v. Hawaii*, 682 F.3d 789, 798 (9th Cir. 2012).

The Free Speech clause protects "expressive conduct so long as that conduct 'convey[s] a particularized message' and is likely to be understood in the surrounding circumstances." *Id.*; *accord Texas v. Johnson*, 491 U.S. 397, 404 (1989). <sup>5</sup> "A 'narrow, succinctly articulable message' is not required." *Kaahumanu*, 682 F.3d at 798 (quoting *Hurley v. GLIB*, 515 U.S. 557, 569 (1995)). The threshold for conveying a particularized message is not high. In *Kaahumanu*, the Ninth Circuit found wedding ceremonies meet this standard because participants "express their religious commitments and values" or "their beliefs and personal commitments." The Court found it relevant to the expressiveness inquiry that these ceremonies are often led by "religious leaders." *Id.* at 799. Here,

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>5</sup> UPC criticizes Chabad's citation of *Texas v. Johnson*. Pl.'s Opp'n Anti-SLAPP 9, Dkt. No. 71. *Johnson* one of the foundational cases establishing the expressive conduct or symbolic speech doctrine. As stated in the original motion, *Johnson* holds that the speech clause protects physical acts "imbued with elements of communication," where there is intent to "convey a particularized message" that "would be understood" by viewers. As explained, the *Johnson* standard is met here. 491 U.S. at 404.

Chabad's Kapparot rite is led by a religious leader and expresses religious commitments, beliefs, values that are likely to be understood by those viewing the ceremony because the symbolism is explained through the spoken portion of the rite. Decl. Rabbi Tenenbaum Supp. Reply, Ex. C.

Other Supreme Court, Ninth Circuit, and California state court precedents confirm that the doctrine of expressive conduct or symbolic speech covers activities whose messages are far less clear than the clearly stated message of Chabad's Kapporat rite. See, e.g., City of Erie v. Pap's A.M., 529 U.S. 277, 289 (2000) (nude dancing); Berger v. City of Seattle, 569 F.3d 1029, 1035-37 (9th Cir. 2009) (en banc) (balloon art); U.S. W. Falun Dafa Ass'n, 77 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 716-17 (Chinese faire). By contrast, Kapparot expresses a clear message of expiation to those attending the ceremony.

The religious expressive activity in the Kapparot ritual could also be protected as pure speech. *See Int'l Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc. v. Lee*, 505 U.S. 672, 677-78 (1992) (holding First Amendment protects public ritual of disseminating religious material and soliciting funds for support); *Murdock v. Pennsylvania*, 319 U.S. 105 (1943) (First Amendment protects door-to-door religious evangelism).

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

UPC seems willing to concede that the spoken word portion of the rite is protected speech. Its brief states that it does not intend to stop the "attendant ceremonies around the practice" of killing chickens. Pl.'s Opp'n Anti-SLAPP 7, Dkt. No. 71. However, the physically symbolic portions of the ceremonies involving chickens cannot be separated from the spoken words that are connected to them. Decl. Rabbi Tenenbaum Supp. Reply, Ex. C. The Kapparot rite, like a wedding ceremony, must be taken as a whole.

Finally, the Anti-SLAPP statute protects expressive activity connected to "a public issue or an issue of public interest" in order to encourage "participation in matters of public significance." Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 425.16(e)(4); Blanchard v. DIRECTV, Inc., 20 Cal. Rptr. 3d 385, 391 (Cal. Ct. App. 2004). Courts have broadly construed this provision as including anything that is "of concern to a substantial number of people." Weinberg v. Feisel, 2 Cal. Rptr. 3d 385, 392 (Cal. Ct. App. 2003). It includes events that limit participation, but permit viewing of the event. U.S. W. Falun Dafa Assn., 77 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 721. The expression at issue here directly involves a community event at which participants engage in expressive religious conduct that has been practiced for thousands of years by a substantial number of people worldwide.

1

45

6

7

8

11 12

10

14 15

13

16 17

18

20

19

2122

24

25

23

26

2728

Because the Kapparot rite is shielded by the Anti-SLAPP, the burden shifts to UPC to prove a probability of success on its claim.

### B. UPC's Lawsuit is a Frivolous Attempt to Chill First Amendment Rights.

Contrary to UPC's assertions, Chabad's motion reaches the heart of the problem the Anti-SLAPP law was designed to address. The purpose of California's Anti-SLAPP statute is to ensure that First Amendment rights are not "chilled through abuse of the judicial process." Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 425.16(a); Navellier v. Sletten, 52 P.3d 703, 718 (Cal. 2002). A defendant seeking refuge in the statute has "no obligation to demonstrate that the plaintiff's subjective intent was to chill the exercise of constitutional speech or p[e]tition rights, or that the action had the effect of chilling such rights." Ingels v. Westwood One Broad. Servs., Inc., 28 Cal. Rptr. 3d 933, 939 (Cal. Ct. App. 2005). A defendant may prevail on its Anti-SLAPP motion without evidence of subjective intent. However, when such evidence exists, as it does here, it guarantees success on the motion. A court "must consider the actual objective of the suit," and it must "grant the motion if the true goal is to interfere with and burden the defendant's exercise of his free speech and petition rights." *Id.* at 941.

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

UPC's true reason for this lawsuit is to improperly pressure Chabad into stopping a lawful religious practice — "the use of chickens in Kapparot." Decl. Karen Davis ¶ 4, Dkt. No. 68-7. Repeatedly throughout this case, UPC has sought to force Chabad to use coins rather than chickens, without any lawful basis for this unconstitutional argument. Pl.'s Ex Parte Appl. TRO 7, Dkt. No. 2 ("Many other entities have stopped killing chickens and instead perform the ceremony by swinging small bags of coins overhead."); Id. at 10 ("As Defendants can easily perform their same ceremonies using bags of coins . . . there is no harm to Defendants in granting this TRO."); TRO Hr'g 40:2-6, Dkt. No. 64 ("[T]hey have not shown that they are going to suffer irreparable harm by performing the ritual with coins."); Decl. Rabbi Klein, Dkt. No. 68-10 ("[N]o practitioner to my knowledge has claimed that using coins instead of chickens would be impermissible."); Pl.'s Mot. Prelim. Inj. 1, Dkt. No. 68-1 (asserting that Kapparot "usually" involves coins and questioning the practice of using chickens in America); Id. at 2 ("[U]sing chickens in these rituals is not required by any religious teaching."). As this Court recognized in dissolving the TRO, it would be unconstitutional for a court to require Chabad to use coins rather than chickens based upon the religious beliefs of others. Thomas v. Review Bd. of Ind. Emp't Sec. Div., 450 U.S. 707, 716 (1981);

1

4 5

6 7

8

10 11

12

13 14

15

16

17

18 19

20

21 22

23 24

25 26

27

28

see also Holt v. Hobbs, 135 S. Ct. 853, 862 (2015); Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2779 (2014); Hernandez v. Comm'r, 490 U.S. 680, 699 (1989).

The timing of the filing of this action further evidences UPC's attempt to place improper pressure on Chabad to alter its religious practice. Although the events citied in the Complaint occurred in 2014, UPC brought this lawsuit a few days before Rosh Hashanah in 2016, creating an unnecessary emergency. Compl., Dkt. 1. Finally, Chabad was in the process of defending itself against the related lawsuit filed by a related party in state court.

UPC used the same technique of creating an unnecessary emergency instead of pursing an existing case in New York State Court. UPC's "Alliance to End Chickens as Kaporos" project sued several Jewish organizations in New York. All. to End Chickens as Kapparot v. N.Y.C. Police Dep't, No. 156730/2015, slip op. at \*3-6 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Sept. 16, 2015), Ex. D. There, the defendant Jewish organizations argued that the plaintiffs, which included UPC, "deliberately engaged in brinkmanship by bringing the application in the middle of the summer with responsive papers due on the eve of Yom Kippur." Id. at \*4. The plaintiffs "fail[ed] to inform the court" that plaintiffs had a pending similar action in Supreme

Court, Kings County, since September 2014. *Id.* at \*4-5. The pending action had two of the same plaintiffs, and they were represented by the same attorneys. *Id.* at 6. The state court issued decisions against the plaintiffs on September 14, 2015 and November 13, 2015. *Id.* 

UPC has a pattern of pursuing and filing frivolous lawsuits against synagogues that use chickens in Kapparot, regardless of the lawfulness of the ceremony. In *United Poultry Concerns v. Bait Aaron*, No. BC592712, (Cal. Super. Ct., Aug. 26, 2015), UPC sued *seven* Los Angeles Jewish organizations and multiple Rabbis who used chickens in their Kapparot ceremonies. The court dismissed the lawsuit on multiple grounds and concluded that UPC was "in fact, seeking recourse of the secular courts to end a religious practice on the grounds that Plaintiffs do not like it, and do not believe it is essential to use chickens for the religious ritual." *Bait Aaron*, at 19, Ex. E.

In an October 19, 2015 statement written by Rabbi Jonathan Klein, one of UPC's declarants, and publicized by UPC's Alliance to End Chickens as Kaporos, Rabbi Klein details strategies to pressure Jewish organizations to stop performing the ritual with chickens. Rabbi Jonathan Klein, "This Year's Los Angeles Kapparot Activities and Next Steps,"

Alliance to End Chickens as Kaporos (Oct. 19, 2015), Ex. F.<sup>6</sup> He wrote of UPC's *Bait Aaron* lawsuit against the Rabbi Netanel Louie and the Hebrew Discovery Center, saying "surely the lawsuit served to curb Rabbi Louie's efforts to perform the ritual. We do, still, have work to do there." *Id.* 

Similarly, the statement states that David Simon of the Animal Protection and Rescue League, one of UPC's attorneys in this case, sent cease and desist letters and sued entities engaged in "chicken-based Kapparot." *Id.* Rabbi Klein wrote that the lawsuit filed by David Simon "certainly sent a chill over those who do this ritual." *Id.* These cease and desist letters are confirmed in a declaration submitted in the parallel state litigation to this case. The Simon Law Group "threatened the Hebrew Academy [in Huntington Beach] with a legal action if it did not agree to sign a certification stating that it would *never engage in the Jewish ceremony of Kaporos.*" Decl. Ronan Cohen ¶ 3, Defs.' Anti-SLAPP Motion, *APRL* case, Ex. B (emphasis added).

Rabbi Klein's statement continues, "Hasidic Jews are ideologically driven to perform this tradition. As a result, it will take much more work, greater sophistication, and wiser tactics to tackle this eight hundred year-

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>6</sup> Available at http://www.endchickensaskaporos.com/2015la\_activities\_ and\_next\_steps.html.

old tradition." Rabbi Jonathan Klein, "Next Steps," Ex. F. He concludes, "the Hasidic community is very concerned with following the law of the land, so if the laws somehow outlaw this ritual, they will bend to follow the law (for the most part). As a result, I am beginning to see if there are ways we can both enforce current laws and pass new ones that will make this ritual virtually impossible to perform, at least at an affordable cost." Id. (emphasis added).

Speaking on behalf of UPC after the TRO was issued in this case, Attorney Bryan Pease told the Orange County Register that "the group is now considering action against other Jewish centers that use live chickens." Kelly Puente, "Judge Blocks Slaughter of Chickens in Jewish Holiday Ritual in Irvine with Temporary Restraining Order," Orange County Register (Oct. 7, 2016), Ex. G.<sup>7</sup>

The Court should not allow UPC to abuse the judicial process to put improper pressure on synagogues nationwide. See Schwarzburd v. Kensington Police Prot. & Cmty. Servs. Dist. Bd., 170 Cal. Rptr. 3d 899, 905 (Cal. Ct. App. 2014) (holding that "petitioners' motivation in filing this lawsuit was, at least in part, to intrude upon the First Amendment rights of

Available at http://www.ocregister.com/articles/irvine-731472-chabad-chickens.html.

the individual Board members. This is the kind of conduct section 425.16 was intended to discourage.").

### C. UPC Has Not Established a Probability of Prevailing.

As UPC cannot meet the essential jurisdictional or standing requirements to bring a claim in federal court, UPC cannot meet its burden of proving that there is a probability that it will ultimately prevail on its claim. All the deficiencies in UPC's claim are detailed in Chabad's Motion to Dismiss and Response to UPC's Preliminary Injunction Motion. Dkt. Nos. 50, 69.

#### D. Chabad Is Entitled to Fees and Costs.

If the Court grants the instant motion, fee shifting is statutorily required. Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 425.16(c)(1). This award of fees is essential to deter future frivolous and harassing filings against other Orthodox Jewish congregations. Chabad's motion is not frivolous and UPC is not entitled to fees under California Civil Procedure Code § 425.16(c).

## IV. UPC IS NOT ENTITLED TO A PUBLIC INTEREST DEFENSE UNDER CALIFORNIA CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE § 425.17(B).

For the reasons UPC is not entitled to attorneys' fees under California Civil Procedure Code § 1021.5 as explained in Chabad's Motion to Dismiss Reply, UPC is also not entitled to the public interest defense to

the Anti-SLAPP statute given in California Code of Civil Procedure § 425.17(b). See Blanchard, 20 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 392 (noting the elements of the 425.17(b) defense "mirror the three elements for determining the eligibility for a fee award under the private attorney general doctrine as codified in section 1021.5.").

The § 425.17(b) defense does not apply to all plaintiffs who merely assert that their claims are in the public interest. Instead, the California Supreme Court has "repeatedly emphasized that the exemptions [to the Anti-SLAPP statute] are to be 'narrowly construed.'" *City of Montebello v. Vasquez*, 376 P.3d 624, 631 (Cal. 2016) (citing *Club Members for an Honest Election v. Sierra Club*, 196 P.3d 1094 (2008)). A plaintiff must establish several mandatory conditions to be eligible for the exemption. *Simpson Strong-Tie Co., Inc. v. Gore*, 230 P.3d 1117, 1125 (2010) (noting the party seeking the exemption bears the burden of establishing entitlement to it). UPC cannot meet its burden.

# A. UPC Has Not Established That The Relief It Seeks Would Significantly Benefit One Person – Let Alone A Large Class of Persons.

UPC seeks to compel Chabad to perform its religious rite in the way UPC wants — with coins or, if chickens must be used, with chickens as food. Because UPC cannot point to one person who would benefit if the

Court were to grant this injunction, UPC has not established that the injunction would "confer a significant benefit" on "the general public or a large class of persons." Cal. Code Civ. Proc. § 425.17(b)(2).

First, Chabad's Kapparot ritual is humane, and multiple government officials who witnessed Chabad's Kapparot ritual in 2014 concluded that it did not violate any laws. Decl. Rabbi Tenenbaum ¶¶ 6, 12-14, Dkt. No. 69-2. UPC's assertions to the contrary are without merit. Pl.'s Opp'n Anti-SLAPP 3-4, Dkt. No. 71. Chabad's injunction would confer no public benefit, let alone a significant one.

Next, several California courts have found that actions seeking to limit opportunities for expressive activities do not confer a significant benefit on the public. *Schwarzburd*, 170 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 905 (holding changing the time or shortening the duration of board meetings is not a "significant benefit" because it would limit public debate); *Holbrook v. City of Santa Monica*, 51 Cal. Rptr. 3d 181, 186-87 (Cal. Ct. App. 2006) (similarly holding "cutting off public comment and input, ending member debate, and preventing the city council from further legislative action" does not benefits the public); *see also Save Westwood Vill. v. Luskin*, 182 Cal. Rptr. 3d 328, 335 (Cal. Ct. App. 2014) (holding "[t]here is no benefit conferred on the public by restraining the [an individual] from donating

money"). Similarly, limiting the opportunity or ability for free religious expression would not confer a significant benefit on the public.

UPC's brief misattributes Chabad's statement that this case involves a dispute that is not about money, but is rather about "public policy." Pl.'s Opp'n Anti-SLAPP. As the context of the statement clarifies, Chabad was stating that this case is about UPC trying to stop a religious ritual that it finds disagreeable, and thereby infringing on the religious rights of the Orthodox Jewish community. Defs.' Mot. Strike 11, Dkt. No. 51. Chabad made no concessions that UPC's interests would benefit the public. *Id.* 

Finally, because the language of § 1021.5(a) and § 425.17(b)(2) are identical, the following § 1021.5(a) cases are persuasive authority in interpreting the "significant benefit" to the "general public" element. In the § 1021.5(a) context, trial courts are instructed to "determine the significance of the benefit and the size of the class receiving that benefit by realistically assessing the gains that [would result] in a particular case." *Baxter v. Salutary Sportsclubs, Inc.*, 19 Cal. Rptr. 3d 317, 321 (Cal. Ct. App. 2004) The benefit gained must be both "significant" and "widespread." *Concerned Citizens of La Habra v. City of La Habra*, 31 Cal. Rptr. 3d 599, 603 (Cal. Ct. App. 2005). Plaintiffs must assert more than a mere statutory violation. *Baxter*, 19 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 321. Here, the injunction UPC seeks

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

would not create a significant, widespread benefit affecting a large class of people. It would not stop a practice that has caused harm to even one person. Angelheart v. City of Burbank, 285 Cal. Rptr. 463, 467 (Cal. Ct. App. 1991) (overturning the trial court as there was no evidence that the action affected people other than the plaintiffs, let alone "affected a large class of persons"); Flannery v. Cal. Highway Patrol, 71 Cal. Rptr. 2d 632, 636 (Cal. Ct. App. 1998) (holding sending a "cautionary message to the defendant" is "insufficient to satisfy the significant public benefit requirement"); Baxter v. Salutary Sportsclubs, Inc., 19 Cal. Rptr. 3d 317, 322 (Cal. Ct. App. 2004) (refusing to find a "significant benefit" on the "general public" because there was "no showing of any harm to anyone"). Rather, the injunction UPC seeks would infringe on the religious exercise of an Orthodox Jewish community, and threaten the free religious exercise of similarly situated people statewide. Far from creating a widespread, significant benefit, compelling Chabad to change its religious practice would cause irreparable harm to Chabad's religious rights. *Hobby Lobby*, 723 F.3d at 1145 ("[I]t is always in the public interest to prevent the violation of a party's constitutional rights."); Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347, 373 (1976) ("The loss of First Amendment freedoms, for even minimal periods of time, unquestionably constitutes irreparable injury."); see also

ľ

Sammartano v. First Judicial Dist. Court, 303 F.3d 959, 973 (9th Cir. 2002); Warsoldier v. Woodford, 418 F.3d 989, 1001-02 (9th Cir. 2005).

#### B. UPC Seeks Relief to Advance Its Own Interests.

To invoke the public interest exception to the Anti-SLAPP, the lawsuit must be brought "solely" in the public interest. *Club Members*, 196 P.3d at 1100 (2008) ("[A]n *action*, as opposed to a cause of action, must be brought *solely* in the public interest.") (emphasis in original). The plaintiff cannot seek any "personal advantage by advancing plaintiffs' own interests" above those of the public. *Id.* at 1099. The term "personal advantage" includes "an individual or particular advantage sought by a group." *Id.* at 1099 n.7. This advantage does not have to be monetary. *Cruz v. City of Culver City*, 205 Cal. Rptr. 3d 736, 743 (Cal. Ct. App. 2016) (seeking to protect "long-standing parking restrictions" would benefit plaintiff); *Club Members*, 196 P.3d at 1099 (seeking to give members unfair political advantage in elections would benefit plaintiff).

UPC purportedly seeks relief for the general public in the form of requiring Chabad to use the Kapparot chickens for food under California Penal Code § 597(a). However, the multiple inappropriate arguments suggesting that Chabad should be required to use coins instead of chickens make it clear that UPC is truly seeking to end the use of chickens

in Kapparot because it involves killing chickens. *See supra* Part III.B. This relief is beyond the relief it purportedly seeks for the others. *See Holbrook*, 51 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 186-87 (citing evidence from declarations to show that plaintiffs' motivations were not solely in the public interest).

### C. UPC Has Not Established That The Relief It Seeks Would Vindicate an Important Right Affecting the Public Interest.

Next, UPC has not established that its lawsuit vindicates an important right. Cal. Code Civ. Proc. § 425.17(b)(2). UPC's brief does not specify any "right" that it is vindicating. UPC also cannot cite rights relating to statutes or causes of action that it did not choose to bring in its Complaint, such as environmental statutes. *Schwarzburd*, 170 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 905 (holding plaintiff was not vindicating an important right by enforcing the Brown Act because the Brown Act did not apply in the case).

Cases interpreting § 1021.5's "enforce[ing] an important right affecting the public interest" element are persuasive. *Cal. Sch. Emps. Ass'n v. Del Norte Cty. Unified Sch. Dist.*, 4 Cal. Rptr. 2d 35, 40 (Cal. Ct. App. 1992) (holding "no important right was vindicated as the judgment simply declared that district had not complied with a statute"); *Grimsley*, 213 Cal. Rptr. at 111 (holding "plaintiff's success did not result in the enforcement of an important public right but alerted the Board of

DEFENDANTS' REPLY IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO STRIKE COMPLAINT

Supervisors to a procedural necessity"). Alleging a mere statutory violation is not sufficient. *Baxter*, 19 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 321. UPC seeking to change Chabad's religious rite does not further an "important right," and it is not in the public interest to compel places of worship to change their practices.

### D. UPC Has Not Established That Private Enforcement is Necessary or that UPC Is Disproportionately Burdened.

Private enforcement is not necessary because several public officials attended the Kapparot ritual and determined it to be lawful. Decl. Rabbi Tenenbaum ¶¶ 6, 12-14, Dkt. No. 69-2. Because UPC is the entity that would gain from this action, it is not "disproportionate" to have UPC bear the cost of the litigation. *Holbrook*, 51 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 187 (holding where plaintiff "stand chiefly to benefit" from the lawsuit, it is not disproportionate for plaintiff to pay). UPC is not entitled to the narrow public interest defense, and the Court must grant Chabad's motion to strike.

### Conclusion

For the foregoing reasons, Chabad respectfully requests that the Court strike the Complaint pursuant to California's Anti-SLAPP Law.

Dated this January 9, 2016. Respectfully submitted,

1 M Jones and Associates, PC 2 Attorneys for Defendants 3 4 5 Michael Jones 6 Hiram S. Sasser, III\* Matthew T. Martens\* 7 hsasser@firstliberty.org matthew.martens@wilmerhale.com Jeremy Dys\* **Gregory Boden** 8 jdys@firstliberty.org gregory.boden@wilmerhale.com 9 Stephanie N. Taub California Bar Number 301779 staub@firstliberty.org 10 Kevin Gallagher\* kevin.gallagher@wilmerhale.com California Bar No. 301324 11 WILMER CUTLER PICKERING FIRST LIBERTY INSTITUTE 12 2001 West Plano Pkwy, Ste. 1600 HALE AND DORR LLP Plano, TX 75075 1875 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW 13 Telephone: (972) 941-4444 Washington, DC 20006 14 Facsimile: (972) 941-4457 Telephone: (202) 663-6921 Attorneys for Defendants Fax: (202) 663-6363 15 \*Admitted Pro Hac Vice Attorneys for Defendants 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27